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2A-12/28/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DUTCHESS COUNTY SHERIFF'S EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-410 6 
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS and DUTCHESS COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Joint Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
LESLIE A. SOUKUP, ESQ., for Petitioner 
ANTHONY DE ROSA, ESQ., for Joint Employer 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 14, 1993, the Dutchess County Sheriff's Employees 
Association (Association) filed a petition to represent the unit 
of employees of the County of Dutchess and Dutchess County 
Sheriff (Joint Employer) currently represented by the New York 
State Federation of Police, Inc. (Federation). The petition was 
dismissed as untimely by the Assistant Director, on behalf of the 
Director. The Assistant Director noted that, under §201.3(e) of 
PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), a petition for representation 
may be filed 12 0 days after the expiration of a contract for 
which no successor has been reached and that that open period 
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would ordinarily be available to the Association, rendering this 
petition timely. However, on the particular facts of this case, 
the Assistant Director dismissed the petition as untimely on the 
ground that the pendency of an earlier representation petition, 
Case No. C-3961,-7 had deprived the Federation of the 
opportunity to negotiate a successor contract during the 
processing of the earlier petition. The Assistant Director 
concluded, therefore, that the acceptance of this new petition 
before there was an opportunity for negotiations between the 
Federation and the Joint Employer was not in keeping with the 
spirit and intent of the Rules. Utilizing the rationale 
articulated by the Director in Village of Sloatsburg,-7 he 
informed the Association that the petition was untimely and 
should be withdrawn or it would be dismissed. The Association 
declined to withdraw the petition and, accordingly, the Assistant 
Director dismissed it. 
-
;0n May 15, 1992, the Dutchess County Deputy Sheriffs Police 
Benevolent Association (PBA) filed a petition seeking to 
represent certain employees in the unit represented by the 
Federation. That petition was dismissed by the Director before 
the Assistant Director issued his decision in this case. By 
decision dated November 30, 1993, we reversed the Director's 
decision and remanded the matter for further processing. County 
of Dutchess and Dutchess County Sheriff, 26 PERB ^3069 (1993). 
^20 PERB J4003, aff'd on other grounds. 20 PERB ^3014 (1987). 
The Director there determined that based upon the employer's 
improper refusal to bargain with the incumbent for a successor 
contract, the incumbent's period of unchallenged representation 
status should be extended. The challenging organization's 
representation petition was dismissed. The Board affirmed the 
dismissal of the petition, but on other grounds. 
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The Association's exceptions assert that §201.3(e) of the 
Rules is clear and that the Assistant Director's decision has in 
effect created a new rule. For the reasons set forth below, the 
Assistant Director's decision must be reversed. 
The statutory period of unchallenged representation status 
is afforded to the parties in a negotiating relationship to 
enable them to have a reasonable opportunity to negotiate a 
collective bargaining agreement and establish a working 
relationship.-7 Under our decisions, the filing of a petition 
to alter the composition of an existing unit halts the 
negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement as to the titles 
subject to the petition during the pendency of the representation 
question.-7 The Rules also provide an open period for the 
filing of a representation petition if a new contract has not 
been reached within 120 days after the expiration of the prior 
contract.-7 Relying on the rationale in Village of Sloatsburgf 
supra, the Assistant Director found that the period during which 
a petition may not be filed should be extended since the 
Federation and the Joint Employer had been precluded, not by 
actions found to constitute an improper practice, but by the 
^See State of New York, 10 PERB 53108 (1977); Nassau Chapter, 
CSEA, 6 PERB 13057 (1973). 
^County of Rockland, 10 PERB 53098 (1977). 
Rules, §201.3(e). 
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filing of the earlier representation petition by a different 
petitioner, from negotiating a successor agreement. However 
disruptive of the negotiating process this halt in negotiations 
may be, it is, nonetheless, not an appropriate basis for 
dismissing an otherwise timely petition.-7 We have previously 
held that "the requirements relating to the filing and processing 
of a certification or decertification petition...must be strictly 
applied, and that it is only within the context of an improper 
practice charge..."-7 that outside circumstances can be properly 
considered.-7 The applicable Rule clearly provides that a 
representation petition may be timely filed 12 0 days after the 
expiration of a contract if a successor contract has not been 
negotiated during the insulated period. There is no ambiguity in 
the language of §201.3(e) and there is no room for an 
interpretation effecting its waiver. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Association's 
exceptions are granted, the Assistant Director's decision is 
-
7This circumstance may be an appropriate basis for our 
consideration of a Rule change. However, such a change should 
not be effectuated by a decision. 
Z/Citv Univ. of New York. 20 PERB «j[3069, at 3148 (1987). 
g/See County of Erie. 13 PERB U[3105 (1980) , conf'd sub nom. Eiss 
v. PERB. 14 PERB 57004 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1981). 
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reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with our decision herein and our decision in Case No. 
C-3961.2/ 
DATED: December 28, 1993 
Albany, New York 
/k i J f^ jCsL\rvyAl& 
Pau l ine R. K i n s e l l a , Chai rperson 
L. E i senberg , Membe 
E r i c y r . Schmertz, Member 
^See supra n o t e 1. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4 02 5 
HEWLETT-WOODMERE UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C. (STUART WEINBERGER of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
EHRLICH, FRAZER & FELDMAN (JEROME H. EHRLICH of counsel), 
for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United 
Public Service Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United 
Industry Workers District Council 424 (Local 424) to a decision 
by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director). 
Local 424 had petitioned to represent currently 
unrepresented employees of the Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free School 
District (District) employed in the following titles: Ten-month 
teacher aides, clerks, hourly teacher aides, security aides, 
school monitors and bus aides. In an earlier representation 
proceeding, the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) had sought to represent these 
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same employees. The Director dismissed CSEA's petition on a 
finding that a separate unit for these employees was not most 
appropriate.-7 Relying upon that earlier decision, and the 
absence of an offer of any new or changed facts from any party, 
the Director dismissed Local 424's petition on the ground, again, 
that the separate unit sought for these employees was not "most 
appropriate". 
Local 424 argues in its exceptions that it is not bound by 
the record in the prior proceeding and that there must be a 
hearing to determine whether there are any relevant facts not of 
record in that proceeding. It also argues that the Director 
misstated its willingness to represent all or any portion of the 
unrepresented employees in a separate unit. 
The District in its response supports the Director's 
decision in its entirety and argues for its affirmance. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Director's 
decision. 
Contrary to Local 424's main argument, the Director did not 
bind it to the record developed in the earlier proceeding 
initiated by CSEA. That record consisted of a series of 
stipulations which were set forth in the Director's published 
decision dismissing CSEA's petition. Local 424 was provided a 
full opportunity to review that record and it does not dispute 
the accuracy of the stipulated facts as stated. The Director 
^Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch. Dist. , 24 PERB ^4043 (1991) . 
The Director's decision in that case was not appealed. 
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merely adopted the record of that proceeding, which involved the 
same employees, as the record in this proceeding after 
ascertaining during the course of his investigation that the 
parties had no new facts to present. Significantly in this 
respect, the Director inquired specifically by letter to the 
parties as to whether they had any additional information to 
offer. Local 424 and the District informed the Director that 
they would not be offering any additional evidence. The Director 
then proceeded, as he had informed the parties he would, to a 
determination on the basis of a record consisting, in relevant 
respect, of the record developed in the context of the proceeding 
initiated by CSEA. We consider this procedure to have been well 
within the scope of the Director's broad discretion in the 
investigation of a representation question. 
Local 424 argues, however, that there must always be a 
hearing on a representation petition on the mere possibility that 
a hearing might produce some relevant information which was not 
produced during the litigation of the same representation 
question in an earlier proceeding. Such a rigid approach to the 
investigation of a.representation question is, however, 
fundamentally inconsistent with the Director's discretion in the 
investigation of a representation question and, moreover, would 
not serve any useful purpose. Quite the contrary, to hold a 
hearing without some indication of a need to do so would only 
serve to delay resolution of the representation questions to the 
certain detriment of all concerned. In this case, for example, 
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Local 424 was specifically extended an opportunity by the 
Director to present new information. Despite that invitation, 
Local 424 simply declined to submit any other information. There 
was no representation to the Director that it had tried but 
failed to ascertain whether there were any new facts, and no 
explanation as to why it reasonably could not, in the absence of 
a hearing, determine whether there were any new relevant factual 
developments not already in the record. In the circumstances of 
this case, therefore, we hold that the Director did not err in 
deciding this matter without a hearing. 
Local 424 also argues that the Director's statement that it 
"does not seek to represent any other configuration of employees" 
misstates its uniting position. Local 424 states in its 
exceptions that it is willing to represent any or all of the 
petitioned-for employees in a separate unit. This clarification 
of Local 424's uniting position, however, is immaterial. It is 
the separate uniting of these employees which the Director held 
to be inappropriate. The inappropriateness of a separate unit is 
unchanged whether the composition of that unit is all or only 
some of the unrepresented employees. 
Local 424 also argues on the basis of the facts as found by 
the Director that a separate unit for these unrepresented 
employees is "appropriate". We agree, however, with the 
Director's decision that it is not most appropriate as required 
under our interpretation of the uniting criteria in §2 07 of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). As the Director 
Board - C-4025 -5 
held, and the District argues, one or more of the several units 
already existing in the District can appropriately accommodate 
the unrepresented personnel. There are currently five separate 
units of District employees: administrative, two units of 
instructional employees, operational/clerical and service. As 
the Director determined, the unrepresented employees do not have 
any special interests which would warrant a separate unit for 
them or preclude their placement into one or more of the existing 
units, pursuant to a petition for that purpose which is timely 
filed. We would cause an undue proliferation of units were we to 
afford these employees a separate unit. 
Our affirmance of the Director's decision does not, as 
Local 424 argues, deny the employees their right of 
representation. That right is not absolute. As the Director 
correctly observed, we must configure a unit in accordance with 
the Legislature's directive in §2 07 of the Act that it be the 
appropriate unit and the employees' right of representation is 
exercised within the confines of that unit. As the unit 
petitioned for, or any variation thereon limited to the titles in 
issue, is not most appropriate, the Director properly dismissed 
the petition. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and the exceptions are dismissed. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 28, 1993 
Albany, New York 
A-U %. t^L 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
&><sLA>*^*/*i 
Eric J./Bchmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, APSCME, APL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13166 
COUNTY OP NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ and JANNA 
PPLUGER of counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE & EISMAN (PETER A. BEE and DANIEL E. WALL of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Nassau (County) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). 
After a hearing, the ALJ held that the County had violated §209-
a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act), as 
alleged by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), when it unilaterally increased the 
work hours of certain nurses stationed at the Nassau County Medical 
Center (hospital). 
From late 1987 until January 1992, certain unit nurses were 
permitted to work three-fifths (twenty-one hours) of the full-time, 
thirty-five-hour standard workweek. The reduced workweek was 
offered by the County, at least initially, because of a nursing 
shortage in the area which made it difficult for the County to fill 
full-time nursing positions. New hires and existing staff were 
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eligible for the three-fifths schedule. Requests for the reduced 
workweek schedule were considered case-by-case and not every 
request was granted. The number of three-fifths employees varied 
over time, but was steadily diminishing, such that by the beginning 
of 1990, the County had essentially stopped offering a reduced 
schedule to new hires. Those employees who were then on a three-
fifths schedule, however, were permitted to remain on it. The 
County sought volunteers to return to the thirty-five-hour week 
during the summer and fall of 1991. That solicitation produced 
about ten volunteers, leaving approximately thirty nurses on the 
three-fifths schedule. By October 1991, the County had decided 
that the remaining three-fifths nurses would be required to revert 
to a full-time schedule. In January 1992, that decision was 
implemented when all but three of the three-fifths nurses were 
involuntarily assigned to a thirty-five-hour per week schedule. 
This charge ensued. 
The ALT held that the County had unilaterally increased the 
employees7 established hours of work in violation of its duty to 
negotiate. The County's exceptions are directed to the ALJ's 
conclusion that there was a cognizable change in past practice when 
the nurses were ordered to revert to a full-time workweek. It 
argues also that the ALJ's reliance on our decision in County of 
Broome, -; in which we held that an employer had violated the Act 
-^ 22 PERB f3019 (1989). 
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by unilaterally replacing full-time employees with part-time 
employees, was incorrect. 
CSEA argues in its response that the ALJ did not commit any 
errors of fact or law and that his decision, with or without 
reliance upon County of Broome, should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALT's decision. 
The County asserts that the ALJ did not properly frame or 
decide the past practice question. Asserting that the charge must 
be read literally, the County argues that CSEA did not prove, as it 
alleged, that the three-fifths schedules were "eliminated" or that 
there was a practice of extending a three-fifths schedule to those 
who either "cannot, or find it difficult to work" a thirty-five-
hour workweek. We hold, however, that the ALJ gave a fair and 
reasonable reading to the allegations in the charge. 
The reduced workweek was eliminated as an option for all of 
the unit employees who were involuntarily ordered to return to a 
thirty-five-hour workweek. That two recovery room nurses were 
permitted to remain on a three-fifths schedule or that there may be 
or had then been one or more opportunities for a three-fifths nurse 
in the recovery room is immaterial. To accept the County's past 
practice argument would mean that an exemption from a work rule or 
order extended by an employer to a single employee would deny the 
affected employees' union any possible rights or remedies under the 
bargaining provisions of the Act regarding a change in the 
employment status quo. As CSEA correctly argues, however, a union 
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represents all unit employees both collectively and individually. 
Therefore, under the appropriate circumstances, changes in practice 
affecting one, some, or all unit employees are equally cognizable 
as refusals to negotiate under §209-a.l(d) of the Act.-7 
In that same respect, CSEA's allegations that the reduced 
workweek was sought by those who could not work or had difficulty 
working the regular schedule concern only the motives for some 
employees seeking a three-fifths schedule. Whether true or proven, 
however, the employees7 reasons for seeking the reduced schedule 
are immaterial to the processing or disposition of the charge. 
CSEA plainly alleges that the subject matter of the charge is a 
unilateral "increase in hours of employment" of the "three-fifths 
employees" caused by the County's order to resume a thirty-five-
hour workweek. The ALJ fairly and properly read the charge in 
accordance with these allegations and correctly framed and decided 
the past practice issue. 
The ALJ's references to County of Broome were in the context 
of arguments regarding the possibility that the increase in work 
hours might be justified as a change in the nature or level of the 
County's services. The ALJ concluded, however, that the 
elimination of the three-fifths positions did not effect a change 
-'The County does not argue that the reduced workweek was 
conditional in nature nor that the discretionary nature of the 
grant rendered its revocation also discretionary. The record in 
any event would not support either conclusion. See Onondaga-
Madison BOCES, 13 PERB 53015 (1980), conf d, 82 A.D.2d 691, 14 
PERB ?[7025 (3d Dep't 1981) (revocation of benefit) and Gananda 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 17 PERB f3095 (1984) (conditional benefit). 
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in the nature or level of the hospital's services. No exceptions 
have been taken in this regard. Without a demonstrated change in 
the nature or level of the hospital's services, the replacement of 
part-time employees with full-time employees, although the same 
persons, was properly analogized by the ALJ to the converse fact 
pattern in County of Broome. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the County's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Immediately offer and, upon acceptance, immediately 
reinstate to a three-fifths workweek, any unit nurse who 
had worked a three-fifths schedule but who was required 
to work thirty-five hours per week on or after January 
1992. 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to post notices of information to the 
affected unit employees. 
DATED: December 28, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
_ ^ ^ . 
^>U/^t^_ < -
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membqfr 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
We hereby notify the employees represented bythe Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
that the County of Nassau will immediately offer and, upon acceptance, immediately reinstate to a three-fifths workweek, any 
unit nurse who had worked a three-fifths schedule but who was required to work 35 hours per week on or after January 1992. 
) 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
County of Nassau 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
2D- 12/28/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUBWAY-SURFACE SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-857 0 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
STUART SALLES, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ALBERT C. COSENZA, GENERAL COUNSEL (GEORGE S. GRUPSMITH 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
) 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Subway-
Surface Supervisors Association (Association) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge against the 
New York City Transit Authority (Authority). The Association 
alleges in its charge that the Authority violated §209-a.l(a), 
(b), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it gave certain of its unrepresented employees a paid 
holiday for Martin Luther King, Jr. Day without extending that 
same benefit to the employees in the Association's unit. The 
second, and major, aspect of the charge, alleges that the 
Authority unilaterally transferred unit work to nonunit employees 
in conjunction with a restructuring of its management with the 
intent of decimating and discouraging membership in the 
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Association. This aspect of the charge centers on a reassignment 
of supervision over the Authority's hourly employees from Level I 
supervisors, who are in the Association's unit, to nonunit Level 
II supervisors. The Association agreed in early 1985 to exclude 
Level II supervisors from the unit as replacements were hired to 
fill vacancies in those positions caused by attrition. 
After six days of hearing and substantial delays in 
processing at the parties' request, the ALJ dismissed both 
aspects of the charge, the first as legally deficient, and the 
second as untimely. The ALJ held that an employer's grant of an 
economic benefit to unrepresented employees, which is not 
simultaneously extended to represented employees, does not 
violate the Act. The ALJ dismissed the second aspect of the 
charge as untimely because the Association knew or should have 
known that nonunit Level II employees were performing unit duties 
in conjunction with their "managerial" positions by at least 
early 1985. As such, the charge, filed in early 1986, was 
instituted well beyond the four-month filing period and, 
therefore, it required dismissal pursuant to the Authority's 
affirmative defense. 
Although the Association has taken exception to both parts 
of the ALJ's decision, the arguments in its brief are limited to 
her dismissal as untimely of the unilateral transfer of unit work 
allegations. The Association argues either that the transfer 
represents a continuing violation of the Act or that the 
Authority's asserted "deceptive and gradual" transfer of the unit 
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work from the Level I employees did not afford it "clear and 
unequivocal" notice of the transfer until some date within the 
four-month filing period. 
The Authority's arguments in response to the exceptions are 
similarly limited to the allegations regarding the transfer of 
unit work. The Authority submits that the Association's 
arguments in support of the timeliness of the charge have no 
merit either as a matter of fact or law. Accordingly, it urges 
that the ALJ's decision be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Preliminarily, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the 
allegation concerning the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday for the 
reasons stated by the ALJ in her decision and as summarized 
herein. Indeed, the Authority's statutory duty to bargain with 
the Association would have precluded the unilateral extension of 
the holiday to the unit employees. 
The ALJ also correctly dismissed the second aspect of the 
charge as untimely on the law and the facts. Although the 
Association argues that the transfer of unit work is a 
"continuing" violation, we have consistently declined to apply 
this concept in the context of our improper practice 
proceedings.-7 The Association cites several Board and ALJ 
-
7State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations), 
26 PERB ?[3058 (1993) ; Triboroucfh Bridge and Tunnel Auth. , 17 PERB 
K3017 (1984). 
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cases, but none support the proposition that we have applied a 
continuing violation concept in assessing the timeliness of 
charges grounded upon a unilateral change in a mandatorily 
negotiable subject of negotiation. Without discussing each of 
the cases cited by the Association, our decision in Middle 
Country Teachers Association-7 (hereafter Middle Country), cited 
most often by the Association, illustrates our point. In Middle 
Country, we merely defined the dates at which an improper 
practice cause of action accrues. In rejecting an exclusive 
first definitive notice theory of accrual, which had been applied 
in certain earlier decisions,-'' we held in Middle Country only 
that a statutory cause of action accrues either on the first 
announcement of the allegedly improper change in policy or 
practice or the first date of actual harm or application to the 
charging party. Middle Country, in fact, adopts the Board's 
earlier decision in City of Yonkers-7 in which a continuing 
violation theory was specifically rejected. Having adopted City 
of Yonkers in Middle Country, it is clear that we did not intend 
Middle Country to reflect a continuing violation theory. 
In making an assessment of the timeliness of a charge after 
the accrual points have been determined, we have consistently 
looked to the date the charging party knew or should have known 
^21 PERB 53012 (1988). 
-
7See, e.g. , County of Monroe, 10 PERB 53104 (1978) . 
^7 PERB 53007 (1974). 
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of the circumstances which might have constituted the violation 
of the Act alleged. The Association's secondary arguments are 
directed to this branch of our case law regarding the timeliness 
of a charge. It argues that the Authority transferred the 
supervisory duties of unit employees in a manner to deceive or 
conceal its actions such that the Association could not and did 
not have clear and unequivocal notice of the transfer until some 
unidentified date within the four-month filing period. The ALJ 
found, however, that the Association knew or should have known by 
at least early 1985 that the Level II employees were regularly 
performing many of the duties of the Level I employees who are in 
the Association's unit. The Association does not contest the 
ALJ's underlying findings of fact in this regard. Having 
reviewed the record, we find no basis to disturb the ALJ's 
findings. The record shows that the Authority's utilization of 
Level II employees to supervise hourly employees was open and 
notorious in each of the Authority's three departments for an 
extended period of time. Notwithstanding the Association's 
claims, the record is not reasonably susceptible to a conclusion 
that the reassignment of supervisory duties from the Level I 
employees was concealed, deceptive or otherwise done in a manner 
which would warrant a reversal of the ALJ's decision to dismiss 
this aspect of the charge as untimely. 
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For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the Association's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 28, 1993 
Albany, New York 
#JL, t .jc«J\ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
.Iter L. Eisenberg, Member £ Walt
Eric J.yschmertz, Member 
2E-12/28/93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, APL-CIO, CAYUGA COUNTY 
LOCAL 806, CAYUGA COUNTY UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13 663 
COUNTY OF CAYUGA, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
BRENT D. COOLEY, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Cayuga County Local 806, Cayuga County Unit (CSEA) to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissing its charge that 
the County of Cayuga (County) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally adopted 
a smoking ban within the Cayuga County Office Building. 
The ALJ found that Article 13-E of the New York Public 
Health Law (PHL), also known as the Clean Indoor Air Act of 1990 
(Air Act), effectively preempted any right CSEA had to negotiate 
the County's smoking ban. 
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PHL §1399-t states: 
§l399-t. Enforcement 
1. For the purpose of this article the term 
"enforcement officer" shall mean the board of health of 
a county or part county health district established 
pursuant to title three of article three of this 
chapter, or in the absence thereof, an officer of a 
county designated for such purpose by resolution of the 
elected county legislature or board of supervisors 
adopted within sixty days after the effective date of 
this act. Any such designation shall be filed with the 
commissioner within thirty days after adoption. If no 
such designation is made, the county will be deemed to 
have designated the department as its enforcement 
officer. Any county that does not designate an 
enforcement officer during the time period specified 
above may do so at any time, thereafter, such 
designation will be effective thirty days after it is 
filed with the commissioner. The enforcement officer 
shall have sole jurisdiction to enforce the provisions 
of this article on a county-wide basis pursuant to 
rules and regulations promulgated by the commissioner. 
In a city with a population of more than one million 
the enforcement officer shall be the board of health of 
such city which shall have sole jurisdiction to enforce 
the provisions of this article in such city. 
2. If the enforcement officer determines after a 
hearing that a violation of this article has occurred, 
a civil penalty may be imposed by the enforcement 
officer pursuant to section thirteen hundred ninety-
nine-v of this article. When the enforcement officer 
is the commissioner, the hearing shall be conducted 
pursuant to the provisions of section twelve-a of this 
chapter. When the enforcement officer is a board of 
health or an officer designated to enforce the 
provisions of this article, the hearing shall be 
conducted pursuant to procedures set forth in the 
county sanitary code, or in the absence thereof, 
pursuant to procedures established by the elected 
county legislature or board of supervisors. No other 
penalty, fine or sanction may be imposed, provided that 
nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit an 
enforcement officer from commencing a proceeding for 
injunctive relief to compel compliance with this 
article. 
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3. Any person who desires to register a complaint under 
this article may do so with the appropriate enforcement 
officer. 
4. The owner, manager, operator or other person having 
control of an indoor area open to the public, food 
service establishment or place of employment under this 
article, shall inform, or shall designate an agent who 
shall be responsible for informing individuals smoking 
in an area in which smoking is not permitted that they 
are in violation of this article. 
5. Any person aggrieved by the decision of an 
enforcement officer other than the commissioner may 
appeal to the commissioner to review such decision 
within thirty days of such decision. The decision of 
any enforcement officer shall be reviewable pursuant to 
article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and 
rules. 
6. The enforcement officer, subsequent to any appeal 
having been finally determined, may bring an action to 
recover the civil penalty provided in section thirteen 
hundred ninety-nine-v of this article in any court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's preemption conclusion, arguing 
that it has the right, both pursuant to the Act and PHL §1399-o, 
to negotiate smoking restrictions which are in excess of the 
minimum requirements of PHL §1399-o. The County filed cross-
exceptions, arguing that the ALT's decision should be affirmed on 
the merits, and, alternatively, the charge should be dismissed as 
untimely. 
On April 10, 1990, the County Legislature enacted 
Resolution 129 of 1990, in accordance with the provisions of PHL 
§1399-o, prohibiting smoking in nonpublic areas of the County 
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Office Building.-1 Smoking was allowed in unshared offices 
without mutually shared air, in certain meeting rooms if no one 
present objected, in designated areas in the cafeteria, outside 
the building and in other designated areas. CSEA made no 
objection to the enactment and implementation of Resolution 129. 
On March 19, 1992, a group of County employees in the unit 
represented by CSEA filed a class action complaint with the 
County Board of Health, stating that smoking was being allowed in 
certain areas of the building which were known to contain 
asbestos; that smoke from individual offices where smoking was 
permitted was filtering out during the workday whenever the 
office doors were opened; and that offices shared common air 
because of the ventilation system within the County Office 
Building. 
In accordance with PHL §1399-t, the County Board of Health 
directed the County Health Department to investigate the 
complaint, hold a hearing and transmit its findings of fact. 
William Catto, the County's Public Health Director, was 
designated as the hearing officer and conducted a hearing on 
-'Smoking was prohibited in the duplicating and copying rooms, 
rooms containing vending machines used by smokers and non-
smokers, any area where chemicals or hazardous materials are 
stored, areas in view of the general public, patient care areas, 
areas containing asbestos, and areas where one or more employees 
object to smoking in their presence or where the air becomes 
contaminated, i.e., where smoke odor can be detected. 
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June 2, 1992. CSEA stipulated that the investigative hearing was 
properly conducted under PHL §1399-t. Based upon his findings, 
Catto recommended that all smoking cease in the County Office 
Building.-7 On June 8, 1992, the County Board of Health, 
pursuant to Catto's recommendation, adopted a resolution 
designating the County Office Building as smoke-free effective 
June 22, 1992. The County itself took no specific action to 
implement the Board of Health ban. The Board of Health advised 
the employees in the County Office Building that smoking would be 
prohibited after June 22, 1992. CSEA filed this improper 
practice charge on July 13, 1992. Additionally, on October 7, 
1992, CSEA brought a proceeding in Supreme Court, Cayuga County, 
pursuant to PHL §1399-t.5, seeking review of the County Board of 
Health's resolution. By decision dated January 29, 1993, CSEA's 
petition was dismissed and no appeal was taken by CSEA. 
Initially, in response to the County's cross-exceptions, we 
find that the charge was timely filed. The County did adopt its 
smoking policy in 1990, but the charge does not complain about 
the adoption or implementation of the County's policy. It is the 
later unilateral alteration of the unit employees' terms and 
conditions of employment that forms the basis of the charge. 
^Catto determined that because asbestos was present throughout 
the building, albeit at acceptable levels, and because of the 
building's ventilation system, all air was mutually shared and 
that a total ban on smoking was necessary to provide employees 
with a smoke-free work place. But see PHL §1399-n.9 and .10 
which define a "smoke-free work area" and "smoking", and State of 
New York (Dep't of Law) , 25 PERB ?[3024 (1992) . 
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Under Resolution 12 9, smoking was permitted in certain areas in 
the County Office Building. After June 22, 1992, no smoking was 
permitted in any area in the County Office Building. The charge 
was filed within four months of that date and is, therefore, 
timely. -1 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's dismissal of its charge on the 
theory that its right to negotiate the subject matter of the 
charge was preempted by PHL §1399-t. The ALJ found that the 
March 19, 1992 class action complaint precipitated an enforcement 
hearing pursuant to the provisions of PHL §1399-t. Catto's 
findings at that hearing formed the basis for his recommendations 
to the County Board of Health that smoking be banned at the 
County Office Building to comply with the requirements of County 
Resolution 129 and the Air Act. It was the County Board of 
Health which imposed and is enforcing the ban on smoking in the 
County Office Building. PHL §1399-t clearly specifies that "the 
decision of any enforcement officer shall be reviewable pursuant 
to article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules." 
The enforcement officer here is the County Board of Health. The 
County itself, as employer, has taken no action with respect to 
the ban, apart from not interfering with the Board of Health's 
enforcement of the ban. Indeed, CSEA, pursuant to PHL §1399-t, 
-/Rules of Procedure, §204.1(a). 
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commenced an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, Cayuga 
County, to review the determination by the County Board of Health 
to ban smoking in the County Office Building. The court upheld 
the Board of Health decision and no appeal was taken. In 
commencing that judicial proceeding, CSEA exercised the only 
method of review of a decision by an enforcement officer 
available to it under PHL §1399-t. 
What is at issue here is not a unilateral determination by a 
public employer as to what is necessary or permissible under the 
Air Act, as occurred in State of New York (Department of Law).-1 
In that case, we held that the State's decision to ban smoking in 
certain of its offices was a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act 
because it was a unilateral adoption by an employer of a smoking 
policy which was more restrictive than the minimum required by 
the Air Act. PHL §1399-o.6(i) subjects an employer's smoking 
policies which are more restrictive than the minimum requirements 
of that statute to the "applicable law governing collective 
bargaining." Here, unlike in State of New York, the authorized 
designee of the County Board of Health made the finding that the 
County Office Building was not in compliance with the smoking 
legislation and ordered the ban. PHL §1399-t provides the 
exclusive method of review of a determination by such a body. 
PHL §1399-o.6(i), the portion of the Air Act which mandates 
collective bargaining, refers specifically to an action of an 
-'Supra note 2. 
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employer, not of a board of health acting in its capacity as the 
enforcement officer for the purposes of the Air Act. It is only 
when the employer, not the enforcement officer, acts unilaterally 
to impose smoking regulations which exceed the minimum 
requirements of PHL §1399-o that our interpretation of the Air 
Act is mandated and permitted. In our view, it is not for us but 
for the courts to review the decision of the County Board of 
Health that the minimum requirements of PHL §1399-o mandated a 
total ban on smoking in the County Office Building and, indeed, 
CSEA sought judicial review of the decision pursuant to PHL 
§1399-t. 
For us to hold otherwise would permit duplicative 
administrative review of the same questions, with the possibility 
of inconsistent results which could place an employer in the 
position of having to ignore the order of an enforcement officer 
in order to comply with a PERB order or vice-versa. We believe 
that the Legislature plainly intended to avoid those consequences 
when it vested ''sole" enforcement jurisdiction in the appropriate 
enforcement officer and provided for judicial review of the 
enforcement officer's determination. 
We, therefore, deny CSEA's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALT. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 28, 1993 
Albany, New York 
1^;^^,t^JV 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Iter L. Eisenberg, Member Wal
Eric J.^Schmertz, Member 
2F-12/28/93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MT. MORRIS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
MT. MORRIS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
CHRISTOPHER J. KELLY, for Charging Party 
HARRIS, BEACH & WILCOX (DAVID W. LIPPIT of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases have been consolidated for decision and come to 
us on exceptions filed by the Mt. Morris Central School District 
(District) to two decisions by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
on a motion to reopen these improper practice charges filed by 
the Mt. Morris Teachers Association, NEA/NY (Association). The 
ALT had conditionally dismissed the charges pursuant to the 
criteria set forth in Herkimer County BOCES.-7 
The charges allege that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally 
assigning supervisory duties to unit members (Case No. U-13890) 
and by reassigning unit members to a mentoring program 
CASE NOS. U-13890 
and U-13891 
20 PERB f3050 (1987). 
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(Case No. U-13891). The Association had also filed a grievance 
alleging that the same actions violated the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement. The ALJ conditionally dismissed the 
charges, but thereafter received a motion to reopen from the 
Association. The ALJ determined that she would reopen the cases 
because the arbitrator had found that the acts complained of in 
the grievance were not covered by the parties' contract. These 
cases involve only exceptions to the grant of the motion to 
reopen. The ALT's decisions were not, therefore, final 
decisions, but merely interim decisions on the Association's 
motion, and the District's exceptions are properly characterized 
as an interlocutory appeal.-'' 
We have previously decided that an "interlocutory appeal 
from rulings by an ALJ is properly entertained only if our 
failure to consider the appeal would result in harm to a party 
which cannot be remedied by our review of the ALJ's final 
decision and order."-' The District has offered no evidence of 
any such irreparable harm which it might suffer if these cases 
are allowed to go forward and be heard by the ALJ. We are 
persuaded that the ALJ's interim decision to reopen these cases 
may properly be reviewed should we be asked to consider whatever 
-
1
 Appeals from rulings of an ALJ on motions or objections made as 
part of the pre-hearing processing of a charge or at the hearing, 
may not be made directly to the Board unless expressly authorized 
by us, pursuant to §2 04.7(h) of the Rules of Procedure. 
^State of New York (Div. of Parole) and Council 82, AFSCME, 
25 PERB f3007, at 3021-22 (1992). 
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exceptions may ultimately be filed to her final decision and 
order. The District's exceptions which seek review of the ALJ's 
decisions to reopen these cases are, accordingly, denied at this 
time. Our denial of these exceptions is without prejudice to the 
District's right to file exceptions to the ALJ's final decision 
pursuant to §204.10 of the Rules. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District's exceptions are 
hereby dismissed. 
DATED: December 28, 1993 
Albany, New York 
f^j.:, i-k.^A 
Pauline R. Kmse l l a , Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membejr 
Eric Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALBERT J. O'ROURKE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12121 
BOARD OP EDUCATION OP THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL, NYSUT, NEW YORK CITY 
(MELINDA 6. GORDON and PAUL H. JANIS of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
JERRY ROTHMAN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(District) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on 
a charge filed against the District by Albert J. O'Rourke. After 
a seven-day hearing, the ALJ held that the District violated 
§209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it transferred O'Rourke on November 9, 1990, the 
day after he had sponsored a chapter meeting of the United 
Federation of Teachers (UFT). The subject of this charge is 
O'Rourke's transfer from the District's Hearing Handicapped/ 
Visually Impaired (HHVI) unit to Citywide programs, another of 
the District's divisions of special education. 
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In its exceptions,-' the District argues that the ALJ erred 
in concluding that O'Rourke was transferred in retaliation for 
his chairing a union meeting. The District argues that the 
record, most reasonably read, shows that O'Rourke was transferred 
because of work place overcrowding and because he had threatened 
two other employees in the context of the union meeting, making 
his continued presence at the work place potentially disruptive. 
UFT, in a response filed on O'Rourke's behalf, argues that 
the ALJ's conclusions are correct and properly rest upon his 
assessment of witnesses' credibility, which must be accorded 
substantial deference. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The ALJ's decision contains a detailed summarization of a 
voluminous record. There are no exceptions taken to the ALJ's 
material findings of fact or his summary of the several 
witnesses' testimony. The District instead challenges the 
conclusions and inferences the ALJ drew from the record as well 
as his credibility resolutions. In that latter respect, we have 
held consistently and the courts have affirmed, that an ALJ's 
credibility determinations, although not always conclusive, are 
-'The UFT filed a response and a brief on behalf of O'Rourke in 
which it argues that the exceptions were not timely filed. The 
exceptions, although received on June 9, 1993, were filed by mail 
on June 7, the last day of the fifteen working days permitted 
under §204.10 of our Rules of Procedure for the filing of 
exceptions to an ALJ's decision. The exceptions were, therefore, 
timely filed. 
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entitled to great weight and substantial deference and should not 
be set aside unless the record otherwise shows those 
determinations to be manifestly incorrect.-7 Having carefully 
examined the record, we find no persuasive basis to question the 
ALJ's credibility resolutions. 
Two factors, among several others, proved significant in the 
ALJ's decision. First is a statement by Kevin McCormack, the 
acting chair of HHVI, to Dr. Maria Lambrou, a colleague of 
O'Rourke, on November 13, shortly after O'Rourke's transfer from 
HHVI. McCormack told Lambrou that O'Rourke "is not the kind of 
person you want to have as your union representative." Much of 
the District's brief to us is devoted to arguments about 
Lambrou's credibility. The ALJ credited her testimony regarding 
McCormack's statement and, having reviewed the record, we do not 
find there to be any reason to reject that credibility 
assessment. 
The second important factor is the circumstances surrounding 
an attempted "permanent" reassignment of O'Rourke in mid-November 
1990 to an office in Queens following O'Rourke's temporary 
reassignment to Citywide programs on November 9, 199 0, which is 
the subject of this charge. The ALJ concluded that this 
"permanent" reassignment to Queens was so irregular as to place 
g/Simpson v. Wolanskv, 38 N.Y.2d 391 (1975); Board of Educ. of 
the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Buffalo v. PERB, 191 A.D.2d 
985, 26 PERB 5[7002 (4th Dep't 1993), motion for leave to appeal 
denied, N.Y.2d , 26 PERB ^7013 (1993); City of Rochester, 
23 PERB |j[3049 (1990) . 
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in serious doubt the credibility of the District's claim that 
O'Rourke's temporary reassignment to Citywide programs was part 
of a personnel transaction already in progress before his 
participation in the union meeting. 
The District argues that the transfer to Queens and any 
other actions taken after O'Rourke's November 9 transfer to 
Citywide programs cannot be properly considered. However, 
actions taken after the acts which are the subject of an improper 
practice charge are admissible, if otherwise relevant, to 
establish the motivation for the acts which are pleaded as a 
violation. 
In summary, we agree that the record establishes that 
McCormack reassigned O'Rourke in an attempt to prevent or hinder 
him from assuming any leadership position in the local chapter of 
the UFT because he did not consider him to be suitable for the 
position. The District's contention that it reassigned O'Rourke 
only for legitimate business reasons grounded upon space 
limitations, employee safety, or workplace disruption were 
properly rejected by the ALT as pretextual, as set forth in 
detail in his decision. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the District's exceptions are dismissed. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or 
coercing Albert J. O'Rourke in the exercise of his right under 
the Act to conduct a chapter meeting of the UFT on November 8, 
199 0, by reassigning or transferring him for the purpose of 
depriving him of that right. 
2. Cease and desist from interfering with the 
administration of the UFT by reassigning or transferring 
Albert J. O'Rourke because he conducted a chapter meeting of the 
UFT on November 8, 1990. 
3. Cease and desist from discriminating in the assignment 
or transfer of Albert J. O'Rourke on the basis of his conduct of 
a chapter meeting of the UFT on November 8, 1990 for the purpose 
of encouraging or discouraging his participation in the 
activities of the UFT. 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all work locations 
ordinarily used by the District to communicate information to the 
employees employed in the Hearing Handicapped/Visually Impaired 
unit of the District's Division of Special Education. 
DATED: December 28, 1993 
Albany, New York 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
We hereby notify the employees of the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York in the Hearing 
Handicapped/Visually Impaired unit of the Division of Special Education that the District: 
1. Will not interfere with, restrain, or coerce Albert J. O'Rourke in the exercise of his right under the Act to 
conduct a chapter meeting of the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) on November 8,1990, by reassigning 
or transferring him for the purpose of depriving him of that right. 
2. Will not interfere with the administration of the UFT by reassigning or transferring Albert J. O'Rourke because 
he conducted a chapter meeting of the UFT on November 8, 1990. 
3. Will not discriminate in the reassignment or transfer of Albert J. O'Rourke on the basis of his conduct of a 
chapter meeting of the UFT on November 8, 1990 for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging 
participation in the activities of the UFT. 
Dated By , 
(Representative) (Title) 
Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4115 
COUNTY OF COLUMBIA, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
Certification - C-4115 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Addendum I. 
Excluded: Addendum II, part-time employees and seasonal 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: December 28, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella^ Chal irperson 
IMMzz. n 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Me: 
Eric^J. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4116 
COUNTY OF RENSSELAER, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
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the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: See Addendum II. 
Excluded: See Addendum I. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 424, a Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: December 28, 1993 
Albany, New York 
3C-12/28/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 687, IBT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4139 
TOWN OF PLATTSBURGH, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 687, IBT has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time, blue-collar employees. 
Excluded: Department heads, assistant water and sewer 
superintendent, crew supervisors and dog 
control officer. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 687, IBT. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 28, 1993 
Albany, New York 
ykuJ.l^ ,- £^(L\r*/J L 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
U4Mcz^ ?. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
Ericyd". Schmertz, Member* 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
LOCAL 264, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4154 
VILLAGE OF CORFU, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Local 264 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full time and regular part-time Water 
Treatment Plant Operators, Sewer Treatment 
Plant Operators, and Maintenance and Custodial 
Employees. 
Certification - C-4154 
- 2 
Excluded: All others employed (seasonal, clerical and 
managerial). 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, Local 264. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: December 28, 1993 
Albany, New York 
fcJ,^^iCw\^f ( 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric/D". Schm©rtg, Member 
